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Analysis of convergence process of East German economy 









The main purpose of the paper is to analyse the speed of regional convergence of 
unified Germany on the basis of a two-region growth model with public productive spending. 
The model explains the dynamics of convergence, taking into account high fixed wages in 
East Germany, recent dynamics of public productive spending, government subsidies for 
private investments and a structure of human capital in both parts of Germany. The paper 
detects a new possible cause of the recent halt of East German economic convergence, 
namely the influence of pre-unification educational infrastructure dynamics. Using the model, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The process of regional convergence has been one of the most important issues in 
German economic development in recent years. East Germany has inherited a 'backward' 
economy from the communist era. Moreover, German unification in 1990 was followed by 
the dramatic decline of output in the eastern federal states. The depression period ended in 
1991 with the East German GDP per capita at 35% of the western level. In 1996 this indicator 
reached 56%, and some optimistic forecasts suggested full convergence in 20-25 years. 
However, since 1996 the convergence process has stalled. Recent studies provide different 
explanations for the current stagnation. Sinn (2000) argues that the current halt of 
convergence results from excessively high East German wages, which have been agreed on 
by trade unions and employers organisations. Sinn (2000) also considers the termination of 
the investment subsidy law (Fördergebietsgezetz) as a possible cause of the problem. Klodt 
(2000) treats an underutilization of capacity of East German firms as the cause of the 
convergence standstill. The present paper sets up the model, which explains the dynamics of 
convergence, taking into account high fixed wages in the East, recent dynamics of public 
productive spending, government subsidies for private investments and a structure of human 
capital in both parts of Germany.  This model allows to analyse causes of the current 
stagnation and to estimate whether they will continue to retard the convergence. The paper 
detects a new possible cause of deficient labor productivity in East Germany, namely the 
influence of pre-unification educational infrastructure dynamics.  
A number of studies define reforms, which can help accelerate the much-needed 
convergence. Some studies offer a number of measures, which allow for wages undercutting 
productivity growth. According to Sinn (2000) these measures include a new system of social 
assistance, opt-out classes and wage asset swaps. Wurzel (2001) supports the idea that the 
scope for plant level agreements should be widened further. Funke and Strulik (2000) as well 
as May (2001) assert that the speed of convergence depends on the effort in infrastructure 
accumulation in the new states. Gundlach (2001) gives an opinion that namely educational 
infrastructure spending can provide further convergence. The present paper compares these 
measures and defines the conditions that allow for the above-mentioned reforms. Both the 
convergence speed and unemployment level in the whole Germany are taken into account 
when analysing possible results of the reform strategies. In some cases excessively high 
convergence speed can lead to an undesirable increase in West German unemployment. This 
paper sets up a dynamical approach for policy recommendations. The main model of the 
paper and the relevant numerical solutions obtained from it show how the government can 
optimally react to the results of wage negotiations. The main numerical finding is that the   3
government should increase public infrastructure spending in the new states only if the speed 
of wage convergence exceeds 0.4% per year.   
Formally, the main model of this paper can be characterised as a two-region growth 
model with government productive spending and human capital accumulation. Some parts of 
the model are based on the ideas of Lucas (1988), Barro (1990), Ono/Shibata (1992), and 
Funke/Strulik (2000). The novelty of the model consists in the introduction of a fixed wage 
ratio between regions, application of a monopoly trade union model in the two-region 
dynamic model, adoption of a continuous form of collateral capital restrictions as well as 
disaggregating labor force by a graduation date. Such a disaggregating has made a decisive 
contribution to the structure of the model, because it allows to explain the current standstill in 
economic convergence of the new states through decreasing proportion of the educational 
infrastructure between East and West Germany before unification. 
The paper is organized as follows: the first section discusses the empirical basis of the 
problem; the second section, entitled “Formalization,” introduces the basic model; the third 
section analyses the causes of the recent halt of East German economic convergence; and the 
final section compares four different strategies for possible reforms of the East German 
economy. 
 
1. EMPIRICAL  BASIS 
 
Characteristic features of the model are based on recent dynamics of basic indicators 
for the convergence process in East Germany. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the empirical base 
for the development of the model. 
Table 1. Basic economic indicators in East Germany in percent of West German level 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Gross domestic product per capita  56.1  55.5  55.7  55.2  55.7  56.2 
Capital  stock  per  capita  54.8 57.3 60.6 63.1 65.5 67.0 
Average  wage  69.8 69.8 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 
Traffic  infrastructure  stock  per  capita  44.7 45.5 46.1 46.8 47.6 48.4 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, own calculations 
Table 2. Unemployment rates in percent 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
West  Germany  10.0  10.0  9.9 9.8 10.0  10.0 
East  Germany  15.9 17.0 16.2 16.1 16.0 16.0 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, own calculations 
   4
At first glance, tables 1 and 2 show paradoxical time series. The first paradox is the constant 
output ratio between East and West Germany. The permanent growth of capital stock and 
traffic infrastructure stock in the new states comparing to the old states must lead to an 
increase in output convergence rate. However, in reality the output grows at the equal speed 
in both East and West Germany. In the present paper this paradox is solved by introducing a 
detailed formalization of human capital dynamics and by disaggregating the labor force 
variable by the date of graduation. Section 3 provides detailed analysis of this paradox in the 
framework of the model. The negative rate of growth of human capital proportion between 
the two parts of Germany will be explained. However, right after such an explanation, the 
second paradox appears. Consider the permanent decrease of human capital proportion 
counterbalances the permanent increase in traffic infrastructure stock proportion so that 
output proportion remains constant. For this condition it is expected that private capital 
demand proportion between the new and the old states will not change and the capital stock 
proportion will remain constant. Despite of this expectation the capital stock proportion 
between East and West Germany continues to grow. This paradox is solved by introducing 
collateral capital restrictions in the model and by assuming that the potential demand for 
private investments in East Germany
1 significantly exceeds the real private investments in the 
new states. Therefore, we assume that the growth rate of capital stock proportion between the 
two parts of Germany is defined essentially by collateral capital restrictions, in addition to the 
other production factors growth rates. 
    
2. FORMALIZATION 
 
Consider a two-region economy. The model includes equations for households, firms and 
government behaviour. The production function has the form 








i i i H L H K G A Y
χ β α β α − − = ,  1 , , 0 < < χ β α ,  1 0 < + < β α ,    (2.1) 
where  E W i , =  denotes West or East Germany,  ) (t Gi  is the capital stock of public traffic 
infrastructure, ) (t Ki  represents the private capital,  ) (t Li  is the size of the work force actually 
employed at time t,   ) ( ) ( t H t H i i =  stands for the efficiency of human capital, and  A is the 
productivity parameter. The bar over  H  indicates that this quantity is given for each 
individual maximizer. The variables  i H  serve to include the external effect of human capital 
in the model. It is assumed 
A A A W E = = , (2.2) 
                                                 
1  Potential demand for private investments – demand for private investments in case collateral capital restriction 
are not active.   5
therefore, we suppose that the cause of the productivity gap between the new and the old 
federal states is the “backward character” of East German traffic infrastructure and human 
capital level. 
The firm sector in region  E W i , =  is described by: 
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where   ) (t i ω  denotes the average wage level,  ) (t Ii  is private investments at time t, δ  is 
depreciation rate,  ) (t r  is interest rate, and  ) (t Bi  is investment subsidies, τ  is the rate of 
corporate tax (Körperschaftsteuer),  i τ  is the average rate of trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) in 
region  W E i , = , and i K  is an exogenous constant, which defines collateral capital 
restrictions. The reciprocal of  ) ( i i I K −
 
was introduced in the firms’ objective function (2.3) in 
order to keep the continuity of the model structure. 
The federal government subsidizes private investments in the new states in order to 
support the reconstruction of the East German economy. The East German firms receive 
additional bonuses from the government. In general, the size of the bonus is directly 
proportional to the investment volume: 
i i i I h B = ,   0 = W h   ,   1 0 ≤ ≤ E h  .  (2.6) 
Further, we refer to  E h  as the “subsidies rate”. Now we can rewrite (2.3) 
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The Hamiltonian of (2.7) and (2.4) reads: 
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To formalize the dynamics of consumption we describe a representative household. The   6
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where ) (t ci ,  E W i , =  denotes west or east consumption per capita at time t,  ρ  is the time 
preference rate, and 1
1 <
− σ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. A representative 
household maximizes  i U  subject to the budget constraint 
i i i L i i i IND z a r a c + − + = + + ω ω τ τ )) ( 1 ( ) 1 ( & ,               (2.13) 
where ) (t ai  represents the value of real wealth of the household,  ) (t zi  represents transfers 
from the government,  IND τ  is the sum of average rates of all indirect taxes, and  ) ( i L ω τ  is the 
average rate of wage tax (Lohnsteuer) in the region  W E i , = . The rate of wage tax is defined 
as a function of the wage level, since this tax is progressive one. 
The Hamiltonian of this problem is 
[] i IND i i i L i
i c z ra
c




τ ω ω τ η
σ
σ





.          (2.14) 
The first-order condition is 
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−
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σ ,              (2.15) 
The co-state equation is 
η ρ η ) ( r − = & .              (2.16) 





















,             (2.18) 
where ) (t Ci ,  E W i , =  denotes total west or east consumption at time t, 
The next step of the formalization is the description of the labor market. The 
formalization is based on the fact that East German wages depend upon West German wages. 
The most important wage negotiations for the new states have been completed in 1991. Only 
West German entrepreneurs participated in these negotiations, because at that time private 
firms in the new states were at the stage of creation. West German negotiators strived to avoid 
an emergence of high-competitive East German firms. The negotiations have defined the 
proportion between East and West German wages. We express this fact formally by 
W E γω ω =   ,   1 0 < < γ ,      (2.19)   7
where  ) (t γ  is the exogenously determined wage ratio. 
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The employment level  ) ( W i L ω  is defined from the solution of the optimisation 
problem (2.7), (2.4). The trade unions choose the wage level to maximize the utility function 
W
W u
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where  i D  is the active population in each region, m and µ  are preferences parameters of the 
immigrants. 
The next part of the model is the description of public and private capital accumulation. 
We assume that a part of tax earnings is spent on public infrastructure accumulation. The total 
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where 
E W C C C + = .       (2.26) 
We denote  1 0 ≤ ≤ i q  as the share of public income, which is spent on traffic infrastructure 
accumulation in each region. Then we describe accumulation of traffic infrastructure by 
i i i G J q G δ − = & ,    E W i , = .    (2.27) 
Similarly 
i i i N J n N δ − = & ,    E W i , = ,    (2.28) 
                                                 
2 We consider only most important taxes.  The real value of public income exceeds the value of J , but its 
dynamics generally coincides with the dynamics of  J .    8
where  ) (t N i  denotes the current stock of educational infrastructure in each region and  i n is 
the share of public income which is spent on educational infrastructure accumulation in each 
region. 
The dynamics of total capital stockK  are represented by 
K J H L H K AG
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where  J ε  is the total amount of transfers from government to households. 
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The equation (2.31) describes the “learning by doing” effect. The equation (2.32) 
describes the influence of educational infrastructure stock on the accumulation of human 
capital. Parameters ψ and  λ are the weights of these two effects. The function  ) , ( t s Hi  
denotes the average level of human capital in the year t for the group of population s . This 
group consists of people, who have finished their education in the year s . 
 
3.   BASIC SCENARIO 
 
In this section the basic solution of the model is considered. The dynamics of the fixed 
wage level in East Germany are still not fully predetermined. Therefore, we must consider 
different variants of an exogenously determined trajectory of  ) (t γ . As a checkpoint for further 
analysis we use the trajectory of fixed wage proportion, which provides a constant value of 









 ,  (3.1) 
after 2003. The basic solution of the model generally coincides with the real trajectory of 
German economic indicators in 1997-2002. It verifies reasonable parameterisation of the 
model. 
Table 3 summarizes model parameterisations. The result of the solution appears in Figure1.   9
Table 3.   Model parameterisation. 
Parameter Description  Value 
) 0 ( W G   Infrastructure in old states in 1997
1  602.7 
) 0 ( E G   Infrastructure in new states in 1997
1  63.7 
) 0 ( K   Total private capital stock in 1997
1  10372 
) 0 ( W D   West German active population in 1997
2   322 
) 0 ( E D   East German active population in 1997
2   76 
) 0 ( C   Total consumption in 1997
1  1933 
W K   Collateral capital restrictions in the old states
1  1410 
E K   Collateral capital restrictions in the new states
1  155 
σ   Reciprocal of intertemporal elasticity of substitution  2.5 
) (ω τ L   Average wage tax rate  0.025 024 . 0 + ω
 
τ   Proportion between corporate tax earnings and total profit of 
private firms before taxation 
0.03 
W τ   Proportion between trade tax earnings and total profit of private 
firms before taxation in the old states 
0.0306 
E τ   Proportion between trade tax earnings and total profit of private 
firms before taxation in the new states 
0.0216 
IND τ   Sum of average rates of all indirect taxes  0.1714 
) (W α   Production elasticity for traffic infrastructure in the old states  0.05 
) (W β   Production elasticity for private capital in the old states  0.39 
) (W χ   Production elasticity for external effect of human capital in the 
old states 
0.2 
) (E α   Production elasticity for traffic infrastructure in the new states  0.03 
) (E β   Production elasticity for private capital in the new states  0.39 
) (E χ   Production elasticity for external effect of human capital in the 
new states 
0.2 
A  Productivity parameter  0.95 
δ   Depreciation rate  0.05 
ρ   Time preference rate  0.02 
E q   Rate of government traffic infrastructure investments in the 
new states 
0.007 
W q   Rate of government traffic infrastructure investments in the old 
states 
0.054 
E n   Rate of government educational infrastructure investments in 
the new states 
0.0025 
W n   Rate of government educational infrastructure investments in 
the old states 
0.0026 
E h   Subsidies rate  0.4 
) (t γ   Fixed wage ratio  See Fig. 1 
W Ψ   Parameter of trade unions utility function  145 
E Ψ   Parameter of trade unions utility function  61.5 
Λ   Parameter of trade unions utility function  0.5 
Ρ  Parameter of trade unions utility function  2.2727 
ε   Share of transfers from government to households in the total 
government spending 
0.218 
T  Average duration of personal economic activity  30   10
S  Average duration of education  10 
λ  Weight of educational infrastructure influence  0.0424 
ψ   Weight of  “learning by doing effect” influence  0.1 
m  Preferences of immigrants  0.1 
µ   Preferences of immigrants  0.5 
] 1997 ; 1957 [
), (
∈ t
t N W  
Educational infrastructure in the old states  37 . 879 4554 . 0 − t  
] 1997 ; 1957 [
), (
∈ t
t N E  
Educational infrastructure in the new states  3.9917 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, own calculations. 
Notes:     1.)  Mrd DM in prices of 1995 
   2.) 
5 10  inhabitants 
 
Figure 1. Basic solution. 
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In the framework of the model and the basic solution, the dynamics of the current halt 
of convergence can be described as follows: Subsidization of the East German firms raises 
the demand for the private investments in the new states. This demand is extremely high, but 
it cannot be fully satisfied because of collateral capital restrictions. Nevertheless, East 
German capital stock grows at a great speed. On the other hand, before unification there was 
a gap in growth rates of educational infrastructure between the two parts of Germany. This 
gap still has an influence on the rate of human capital convergence between East and West   11
Germany because the labour force with educations obtained before 1991 still accounts for a 
major proportion of the East German population (equation (2.30)). Due to the fact that before 
unification the educational infrastructure stock grew more rapidly in West Germany than in 
East Germany, the difference in human capital levels between the two parts of the country 
will continue to increase until the proportion of the population with education obtained after 
1991 remains above a critical level. As seen in figure 2, this critical moment corresponds to 
the year 2007. 
Figure 2. Basic solution. 
East German human capital level in % of West German level 
 













Such a behaviour of human capital levels in the new and old states explains the 
current halt of East German economic convergence. The convergence rate can be factorised 
as follows: 
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With this factorisation one notes that the component  1 θ  has decreased in recent years, the 
component  2 θ  has increased, and the component  3 θ  has remained approximately constant. 
Moreover the technological coefficients and current values of economic indicators have led to 
approximately equal growth speeds of  ) ( 1 θ −   and  2 θ . This implies a constant level of the 
convergence rate and explains the current halt of East German economic convergence. 
 
4.  APPLICATION OF THE MODEL FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The current stagnation of the regional convergence can be overcome. To accomplish 
this, at least one of the four factors of production must be affected in order to raise the output 
in the new states. Therefore, there are at least four strategies that will allow economic 
convergence to continue. The East German traffic infrastructure stock and human capital 
level can be raised by enlargement of public investments in the corresponding infrastructure 
component. In terms of the model this means an increase in parameters  E q
 
or  E n .  The 
growth rate of capital stock in the new states can be accelerated by increasing government 
subsidies to private firms. This strategy corresponds to an increase in the subsidies rate  E h . 
The employment level in East Germany can also be raised. The reduction of East German 
wages is a possible way to attain higher employment. In terms of the model, this variant of 
reform corresponds to a decrease of the growth speed of γ . 
The model allows us to estimate numerically the results of the described reforms. 
Below we compare the efficiencies of each reform strategy. For this purpose, four additional 
numerical solutions of the model were obtained. Three of these solutions show the results of 
the possible enlargement of public transfers to the East German economy with 2 Mrd DM per 
year. This sum is supposed to be spent to raise three different parameters  E q ,  E n
 
or  E h . Each 
solution corresponds to an increase in one from these parameters. The increase in public 
expenditures is supposed to take place during 2003. Before this year the considered solutions 
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Figure 4. Numerical solution for the case of enlargement of educational infrastructure 
investments in East Germany since 2003 
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Figure 3. Numerical solution for the case of enlargement of traffic infrastructure investments in 
East Germany since 2003 
% 100 ) ( × t θ - East German output per 
capita in % of West German level 
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Figure 5. Numerical solution for the case of increase in subsidies rate since 2003 
% 100 ) ( × t θ - East German output per capita in 
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The results of these numerical solutions show that these three strategies all have the 
same disadvantage, namely a significant increase in unemployment in the old states. 
The next numerical solution demonstrates the results of changing the exogenously determined 
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Figure 7. Numerical solution for the case of low growth rate of wage level in East Germany 
since 2003  
% 100 ) ( × t θ - East German output per 
capita in % of West German level 
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Figure 6. Numerical solution for the case of additional acceleration of wage level growth in 
East Germany since 2003  
% 100 ) ( × t θ - East German output per 
capita in % of West German level 
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These solutions demonstrate that an additional acceleration of wage level convergence 
will lead to an increase in unemployment in the new states and regression in output 
convergence. A rate of wage convergence that is too low can also be harmful, because it will 
result in high unemployment in the old states. The results show the necessity for a moderate 
decrease in the growth rate of wage levels in East Germany in comparison to the basic 
solution between 2003 and 2006. On the other hand, after overcoming the critical level of 
East German human capital in 2007, the wage convergence should be accelerated.  The 
example of such wage proportion trajectory  ) (t γ   is given by the next numerical solution 
presented in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Numerical solution for the case of recommended strategy of wage level growth in 
East Germany since 2003  
% 100 ) ( × t θ - East German output per capita in 
% of West German level 
 







% 100 ) ( × t γ - fixed level of East German 
wages in % of West German level 
 







Unemployment rate in East Germany(%)     
 






      
Unemployment rate in West Germany(%) 
 








   17
 
 
Generally, a government cannot directly control wage determination, therefore the 
recommended strategy does not provide direct instructions on quantitative values of policy 
instruments. Nevertheless, the solution provides information on the necessary government 
reaction to future results of wage negotiations. If East German wages grow slower than in the 
recommended strategy, the government must decrease the volume of support for East 
Germany in order to prevent an increase in unemployment in West Germany. However, if the 
future wage negotiations result in more rapid wage convergence, the government must 





Despite the current standstill, economic convergence of East Germany can be 
continued in the succeeding years. The cause of the temporary halt of convergence in 1996-
2002 is the deficient growth rate of educational infrastructure in East Germany between 1980 
and 1990. The labor force with an education obtained in the eighties accounts for a major part 
of labor force at present. Therefore, the educational infrastructure level in 1980-1990 has a 
direct influence on the present East German economic convergence. 
As can be seen from the introduced model, there are a number of measures, which can 
help to accelerate the much-needed convergence. The mathematical approach, which have 
been developed and explained in this paper, is a practical way to clearly compare these 
measures. A significant increase in output convergence speed would be harmful because of 
the increase in unemployment this can create in the old states. Maintaining the wage 
convergence speed at approximately 0.4% per year appears to be the optimal variant of 
development, as this does not lead to an increase in West German unemployment. Since 
controlling wage level can be difficult for federal government, the estimation of optimal wage 
convergence can serve as an orientation point for the choice of government support volume 
for the new states. If East German wages grow slower than 0.4% per year, the government 
must decrease the volume of support for East Germany in order to prevent an increase in 
unemployment in West Germany. However, in case the future wage negotiations result in 
more rapid wage convergence, the government must increase public infrastructure spending 
in the new states in order to provide further output convergence between East and West 
Germany. 
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